YoungEC '19

8:30 - 8:50

Registration and Coffee

8:50 - 9:00

Noam Nisan and Michal Feldman : Welcome

9:00 - 9:45

Steve Tadelis: Raising the Bar: Certification Thresholds and Market Outcomes 

9:45 - 10:10

Ellen Muir: Efficient Adjustment Dynamics

Coffee

10:30 - 10:55

Gali Noti: Neural Networks for Predicting Human Interactions in Repeated Games

10:55 - 11:20

Lee Cohen: Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration

Coffee

11:40 - 12:05

Bar Light: Quality selection in two-sided platforms

12:05 - 12:30

Steffen Schuldenzucker: Financial Networks with Derivatives: Complexity and Systemic Risk 

Lunch

14:00 - 14:25

Weiran Shen: AI-driven mechanism design

14:25 - 14:50

Arpita Biswas: Fair Allocation of Structured Set Systems

Coffee

15:10 - 15:35

Yixin Tao: Balancing the Robustness and Convergence of Tatonnement 

15:35 - 16:00

Ariel Schvartzman: Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values

Coffee

16:20 - 16:45

Alon Eden: Auction Design under Interdependent Value 

16:45 - 17:30

Paul Milgrom: Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms

10:00 - 10:25

Zi Yang Kang: Strategy-Proof Bilateral Trade [

10:25 - 10:50

Ben Berger: On the power and limits of dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets

Coffee

11:10 - 11:35

Elisheva S. Shamash: Principal-Agent VCG Contracts

11:35 - 12:00

Yifeng Teng: Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing

12:00 - 12:25

Giorgio Martini: Multidimensional Disclosure

Lunch

14:00 - 14:45

Yoelle Maarek: Alexa, can you help me shop?

14:45 - 15:10

Divya Mohan: Approximation Schemes for Revenue Maximization via Symmetries

Coffee

15:30 - 15:55

Yannai Gonczarowski: A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis

15:55 - 16:20

Kira Goldner: Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition Values 

Coffee

16:40 - 17:05

Yuan Deng: Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond 

17:05 - 17:30

Neil Newman: A Second Look at the Incentive Auction: Exploring Trade-offs in the Incentive Auction Design Space 

19:30

Workshop Dinner

9:00 - 9:45

Nina Balcan: Machine Learning for Mechansim Design 

9:45 - 10:10

Omer Ben-Porat: Fiduciary Bandits 

Coffee

10:30 - 10:55

Tomer Ezra: A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets 

10:55 - 11:20

Andres Cristi: The two-sided game of Googol and sample-based prophet inequalities 

Coffee

11:40 - 12:05

Ron Kupfer: The Adaptive Complexity of Maximizing Gross Substitutes Functions

12:05 - 12:30

Rebecca Reiffenhauser: Secretary Algorithms for Online Assignment Problems

Lunch

14:00 - 14:25

Segev Shlomov: Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning 

14:25 - 14:50

Shuran Zheng: Selling Information Through Consulting 

Coffee

15:10 - 15:35

Ellen Vitercik: Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility 

15:35 - 16:20

Yishay Mansour: Exploration, Exploitation and Incentives