Publications

EC Lab@TAU Past and forthcoming publications

Publications
EC Lab@TAU Past and forthcoming publications

Working Papers

  • Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases
    Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
  • On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
    [ arxiv ]

2019+Forthcoming

  • Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Matt Weinberg 
    Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’19), 2019.
    [ arxiv ]
  • Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna Karlin 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award)
    [ arxiv ]
  • Stable Secretaries
    Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky 
    Algorithmica, 81(8): 3136–3161 (2019).
    [ arxiv ]
  • Max-Min Greedy Matching
    Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman 
    International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX’19), 2019. Also presented at EC Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2019)
    [ arxiv ]
  • A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ophir Friedler 
    EC Workshop on Workshop on Behavioral Economics and Computation, 2019.
    [ arxiv ]
  • Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholz 
    ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) (accepted for publication)
  • Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff
    Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal 
    Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'19), 2019

2018

  • Interdependent Values without Single Crossing
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
  • Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ilan Nehama 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
  • 99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
  • Pricing Identical Items
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong 
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2018 (WINE'18)
  • Prompt Scheduling of Selfish Agents
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Tzahi Taub 
    26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA'18), 2018
  • An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal 
    [ writeup ]

2017

  • Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
    Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier 
    Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017 (FOCS'17)
    [ arxiv ]
  • Approximate Modularity Revisited
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inal Talgam-Cohen 
    ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2017 (STOC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
    Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Alan Roytman 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Stable Secretaries
    Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Pricing Social Goods
    Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman 
    European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017 (ESA'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi 
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17) Best Paper Award.
  • Liquid Price of Anarchy
    Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman 
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
    [ arxiv ]
  • The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics
    Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir 
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)

2016

  • Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
    SIAM Journal on Computing, 45(1): 29--48 (2016)
    [ journal | arxiv ]
  • Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
    Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri 
    ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1):8:1-8:26 (2016)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers
    Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar 
    NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 (NIPS'16)
    [ conference ]
  • Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan 
    WINE 2016: 131-144 (WINE'16)
    [ arxiv ]
  • Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen 
    International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, 2016 (APPROX'16)
    [ conference ]
  • The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
    Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis 
    ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2016 (STOC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Lottery Pricing Equilibria
    Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference ]
  • Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference ]
  • Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tenneholtz 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • On Voting and Facility Location
    Michal Feldman, Iddan Golumb, Amos Fiat 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
    Vincent Cohen-Addad, Michal Feldman, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
    Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier 
    Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on STOC'13, forthcoming
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model
    Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova 
    Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 2016: 496-501
    [ conference ]

2015

  • Capacitated Network Design Games
    Michal Feldman and Tom Ron 
    Theory of Computing Systems, 57(3): 576-597 (2015)
    [ journal ]
  • Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
    SODA 2015: 123-135
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Implementing the Wisdom of Waze
    Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim, Shoshana Vasserman 
    IJCAI 2015
    [ conference ]
  • How Robust is the Wisdom of the Crowds?
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz 
    IJCAI 2015
    [ conference ]
  • A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler 
    ICALP 2015
    [ conference ]
  • Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
    Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir 
    Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015)
    [ conference | journal ]
  • Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium
    Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein 
    WINE 2015: 300-313
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis: 
    AAAI 2015: 872-878
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
    Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri 
    AAAI 2015: 879-885
    [ conference | arxiv | journal ]

2014

  • Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
    Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz 
    ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5 (2014)
    [ conference | arxiv | journal ]
  • Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning inSocial Networks
    Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg 
    APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208
    [ arxiv ]
  • Clearing Markets via Bundles
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier 
    SAGT 2014: 158-169
    [ arxiv ]
  • Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes
    Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz 
    Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014 (ITCS'14)
    [ conference ]
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