Publications

Working Papers

  • Max-Min Greedy Matching
    Alon Eden, Uriel Feige and Michal Feldman
  • Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases
    Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
  • On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
    [ arxiv ]

2019+Forthcoming

  • Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren and Moshe Tennenholz 
    ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) (accepted for publication)
  • Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff
    Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal 
    Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'19), 2019

2018

  • Interdependent Values without Single Crossing
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kira Goldner 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
  • Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman and Ilan Nehama 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
  • 99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 (EC'18)
  • Pricing Identical Items
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong 
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 2018 (WINE'18)
  • Prompt Scheduling of Selfish Agents
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Tzahi Taub 
    26th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA'18), 2018
  • An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Kineret Segal 
    [ writeup ]

2017

  • Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
    Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier 
    Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017 (FOCS'17)
    [ arxiv ]
  • Approximate Modularity Revisited
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inal Talgam-Cohen 
    ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2017 (STOC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
    Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Alan Roytman 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Stable Secretaries
    Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky 
    ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Pricing Social Goods
    Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman 
    European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017 (ESA'17)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
    Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi 
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17) Best Paper Award.
  • Liquid Price of Anarchy
    Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman 
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
    [ arxiv ]
  • The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics
    Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir 
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)

2016

  • Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
    SIAM Journal on Computing, 45(1): 29--48 (2016)
    [ journal | arxiv ]
  • Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
    Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri 
    ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1):8:1-8:26 (2016)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers
    Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar 
    NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 (NIPS'16)
    [ conference ]
  • Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan 
    WINE 2016: 131-144 (WINE'16)
    [ arxiv ]
  • Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen 
    International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, 2016 (APPROX'16)
    [ conference ]
  • The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
    Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis 
    ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2016 (STOC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Lottery Pricing Equilibria
    Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference ]
  • Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference ]
  • Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tenneholtz 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • On Voting and Facility Location
    Michal Feldman, Iddan Golumb, Amos Fiat 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
    Vincent Cohen-Addad, Michal Feldman, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat 
    ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
    Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier 
    Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on STOC'13, forthcoming
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model
    Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova 
    Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 2016: 496-501
    [ conference ]

2015

  • Capacitated Network Design Games
    Michal Feldman and Tom Ron 
    Theory of Computing Systems, 57(3): 576-597 (2015)
    [ journal ]
  • Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
    Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
    SODA 2015: 123-135
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Implementing the Wisdom of Waze
    Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim, Shoshana Vasserman 
    IJCAI 2015
    [ conference ]
  • How Robust is the Wisdom of the Crowds?
    Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz 
    IJCAI 2015
    [ conference ]
  • A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games
    Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler 
    ICALP 2015
    [ conference ]
  • Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
    Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir 
    Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015)
    [ conference | journal ]
  • Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium
    Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein 
    WINE 2015: 300-313
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
    Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis: 
    AAAI 2015: 872-878
    [ conference | arxiv ]
  • Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
    Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri 
    AAAI 2015: 879-885
    [ conference | arxiv | journal ]

2014

  • Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
    Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz 
    ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5 (2014)
    [ conference | arxiv | journal ]
  • Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning inSocial Networks
    Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg 
    APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208
    [ arxiv ]
  • Clearing Markets via Bundles
    Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier 
    SAGT 2014: 158-169
    [ arxiv ]
  • Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes
    Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz 
    Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014 (ITCS'14)
    [ conference ]
Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel
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