Publications

Working Papers

• 99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
  Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler and Aviad Rubinstein
• Pricing Identical Items
  Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden and Warut Suksompong 
  [ arxiv ]
• Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases
  Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz
• On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing
  Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
  [ arxiv ]

2017+Forthcoming

• Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
  Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim and Brendan Lucier 
  Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2017 (FOCS'17)
  [ arxiv ]
• Approximate Modularity Revisited
  Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inal Talgam-Cohen 
  ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2017 (STOC'17)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders
  Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg 
  ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
  Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg 
  ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices
  Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat and Alan Roytman 
  ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Stable Secretaries
  Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky 
  ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2017 (EC'17)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Pricing Social Goods
  Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman 
  European Symposium on Algorithms, 2017 (ESA'17)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Online Random Sampling and Applications to Budgeted Settings
  Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi 
  Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17) Best Paper Award.
• Liquid Price of Anarchy
  Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman 
  Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)
  [ arxiv ]
• The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics
  Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir 
  Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2017 (SAGT'17)

2016

• Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
  Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
  SIAM Journal on Computing, 45(1): 29--48 (2016)
  [ journal | arxiv ]
• Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
  Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri 
  ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1):8:1-8:26 (2016)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers
  Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar 
  NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 (NIPS'16)
  [ conference ]
• Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
  Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan 
  WINE 2016: 131-144 (WINE'16)
  [ arxiv ]
• Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap
  Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen 
  International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, 2016 (APPROX'16)
  [ conference ]
• The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
  Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis 
  ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2016 (STOC'16)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Lottery Pricing Equilibria
  Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi 
  ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
  [ conference ]
• Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements
  Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner 
  ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
  [ conference ]
• Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups
  Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tenneholtz 
  ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• On Voting and Facility Location
  Michal Feldman, Iddan Golumb, Amos Fiat 
  ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing
  Vincent Cohen-Addad, Michal Feldman, Alon Eden, Amos Fiat 
  ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2016 (EC'16)
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
  Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin and Brendan Lucier 
  Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on STOC'13, forthcoming
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model
  Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova 
  Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) 2016: 496-501
  [ conference ]

2015

• Capacitated Network Design Games
  Michal Feldman and Tom Ron 
  Theory of Computing Systems, 57(3): 576-597 (2015)
  [ journal ]
• Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
  Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier 
  SODA 2015: 123-135
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Implementing the Wisdom of Waze
  Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim, Shoshana Vasserman 
  IJCAI 2015
  [ conference ]
• How Robust is the Wisdom of the Crowds?
  Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz 
  IJCAI 2015
  [ conference ]
• A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games
  Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler 
  ICALP 2015
  [ conference ]
• Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
  Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir 
  Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015)
  [ conference | journal ]
• Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive BundlingEquilibrium
  Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein 
  WINE 2015: 300-313
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
  Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis: 
  AAAI 2015: 872-878
  [ conference | arxiv ]
• Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions?
  Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri 
  AAAI 2015: 879-885
  [ conference | arxiv | journal ]

2014

• Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization
  Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz 
  ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 2(2): 5 (2014)
  [ conference | arxiv | journal ]
• Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning inSocial Networks
  Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg 
  APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208
  [ arxiv ]
• Clearing Markets via Bundles
  Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier 
  SAGT 2014: 158-169
  [ arxiv ]
• Sequential Decision Making with Vector Outcomes
  Yossi Azar, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz 
  Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2014 (ITCS'14)
  [ conference ]